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Abstract 
We present the language PC+ for probabilistic 
reasoning about actions, which is a generaliza­
tion of the action language C + that allows to deal 
with probabilistic as well as nondeterministic ef­
fects of actions. We define a formal semantics 
of PC+ in terms of probabilistic transitions be­
tween sets of states. Using a concept of a history 
and its belief state, we then show how several im­
portant problems in reasoning about actions can 
be concisely formulated in our formalism. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
One of the most crucial problems that we have to face in 
reasoning about actions for mobile robotics in real-world 
environments is uncertainty, both about the initial situation 
of the robot's world and about the results of the actions 
taken by the robot (due to noisy effectors and/or sensors). 
One way of adding uncertainty to reasoning about actions 
is based on qualitative models in which all possible alterna­
tives are equally taken into consideration. Another way is 
based on quantitative models where we have a probability 
distribution on the set of possible alternatives, and thus can 
numerically distinguish between possible alternatives. 
Well-known first-order formalisms for reasoning about ac­
tions such as the situation calculus [18] easily allow for 
expressing qualitative uncertainty about the effects of ac­
tions and the initial situation of the world through disjunc­
tive knowledge. Moreover, there are generalizations of the 
action language A [6] that allow for qualitative uncertainty 
in the form of nondeterministic actions. An important re­
cent formalism in this family is the action language C+ [7], 
which is based on the theory of nonmonotonic causal rea­
soning presented in [13], and has evolved from the action 
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language C [8]. In addition to allowing for conditional and 
nondeterministic effects of actions, C + also supports con­
current actions as well as indirect effects and preconditions 
of actions through static causal laws. Closely related to it 
is the recent planning language K. [3]. 
There are a number of formalisms for probabilistic reason­
ing about actions. In particular, Bacchus et a!. [ 1] propose a 
probabilistic generalization of the situation calculus, which 
is based on first-order logics of probability, and which al­
lows to reason about an agent's probabilistic degrees of be­
lief and how these beliefs change when actions are exe­
cuted. Poole's independent choice logic [16, 17] is based 
on acyclic logic programs under different "choices". Each 
choice along with the acyclic logic program produces a 
first-order model. By placing a probability distribution over 
the different choices, we then obtain a distribution over the 
set of first-order models. Other probabilistic extensions of 
the situation calculus are given in [12, 5]. A probabilistic 
extension of the action language A is given in [2]. 
The main idea behind the present paper is to orthogonally 
combine qualitative and quantitative uncertainty in a uni­
form framework for reasoning about actions: Even though 
there is extensive work on qualitative and quantitative mod­
els separately, there is only few work on such combina­
tions. One such approach is due to Halpern and Tuttle [10], 
which combines nondeterminism and probabilistic uncer­
tainty in a game-theoretic framework. Halpern and Tut­
tle argue in particular that "some choices in a distributed 
system must be viewed as inherently nondeterministic (or, 
perhaps better, nonprobabilistic ), and that it is inappropri­
ate, both philosophically and pragmatically, to model prob­
abilistically what is inherently nondeterministic". This un­
derlines the strong need for explicitly modeling qualitative 
uncertainty in addition to probabilistic uncertainty. 
In this paper, we combine the qualitative uncertainty in the 
action languageC+ with probabilistic uncertainty as in [16, 
17]. The main contributions are summarized as follows: 
• We present the language PC+ for probabilistic reason­
ing about actions, which is a probabilistic generalization of 
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the action language C +. It allows for representing actions 
with conditional and indirect effects, nondeterministic ac­
tions, and concurrently executed actions as the main fea­
tures of C+ as well as probabilistic knowledge about the 
effects of actions and the initial situation of the world. 
• As a central property, PC+ combines in a single frame­
work qualitative as well as quantitative uncertainty, both 
about the effects of actions and about the initial situation 
of the world. Here, qualitative uncertainty is represented 
by forming a set of possible alternatives, while quantitative 
uncertainty is expressed through a probability distribution 
on a set of possible sets of possible alternatives. 
• We define a formal semantics of PC+ by interpreting 
probabilistic action descriptions in PC+ as probabilistic 
transitions as in partially observable Markov decision pro­
cesses (POtv1DPs) [11]. However, it is important to point 
out that these probabilistic transitions are between sets of 
states rather than single states. It is this which allows to 
handle qualitative uncertainty in addition to the quantita­
tive probabilistic uncertainty as in POMDPs. Differently 
from standard POMDPs, our approach here only allows for 
observations without noise, but not for noisy sensing. It 
also does not deal with costs/rewards of actions. 
• We define histories and their belief states in PC+. Infor­
mally, a history h is a sequence of actions and observations, 
which are labeled with a reasoning modality over sets of 
states. It has an associated belief state, which comprises 
possible sets of states and probabilistic information to de­
scribe the qualitative and quantitative knowledge about h. 
Note that such belief states model partial observability. 
• We show how to express a number of important prob­
lems in probabilistic reasoning about actions (namely, the 
problems of prediction, postdiction, and planning; see es­
pecially [18, 12, 7]) in terms of belief states in PC+. 
The work closest in spirit to this paper is perhaps the one 
by Baral et al. [2]. which also proposes a logic-based for­
malism for probabilistic reasoning about actions. How­
ever, there are several crucial differences. First, and as a 
central conceptual difference, our work orthogonally com­
bines quantitative and qualitative uncertainty, in the form 
of probability distributions and sets of possible alternatives, 
respectively, while Baral et al. only allow for quantitative 
uncertainty in the form of probability distributions. Note 
that Baral et al. circumvent the problem of dealing with 
qualitative uncertainty by making the strong assumption of 
a uniform distribution whenever the probabilities for pos­
sible alternatives are not known. Second, Baral et al. al­
low only for a quite restricted form of probability distribu­
tions, which are either uniform distributions or produced 
from uniform distributions. Third, our language PC+ gen­
eralizes the action language C+. while Baral et al.'s lan­
guage generalizes the action language A. Note that C + is 
a novel action language that evolved from A and that is 
much more expressive than A. 
Another important formalism that is related to ours is 
Poole's independent choice logic [16, 17], which uses a 
similar way of adding probabilities to an approach based 
on acyclic logic programs. But also here the central con­
ceptual difference is that Poole's independent choice logic 
does not allow for qualitative uncertainty in addition to 
quantitative uncertainty. Poole circumvents the problem of 
dealing with qualitative uncertainty by imposing the strong 
condition of acyclicity on logic programs. Furthermore, 
Poole's work is more inspired by the situation calculus and 
less by the action languages around A. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, 
we define PC+ and its semantics in probabilistic transi­
tions between sets of states. Section 3 introduces histories 
and belief states. In Section 4, we describe how several im-
pcrtant problems in probabilistic reasoning about actions 
can be expressed in our framework. Section 5 summarizes 
the main results and gives an outlook on future research. 
Note that further technical results and detailed proofs of all 
results are given in the extended version of this paper [4]. 
2 SYNTAX AND SEMANTICS OF PC+ 
In this section, we first recall nonmonotonic causal theo­
ries from [7]. We then present the language PC+ for prob­
abilistic reasoning about actions, and give an example of 
a probabilistic action description and initial database ex­
pressed in PC+. We finally define the semantics of PC+ 
through probabilistic transitions between sets of states. 
Informally, the main idea behind our probabilistic exten­
sion of C + is to associate with the initial database and 
with every stochastic action a probability distribution on 
a set of contexts, which are values of exogenous variables. 
Every sequence of actions from an initial database is then 
associated with a probability distribution on a set of com­
bined contexts. Hence, probabilistic reasoning about ac­
tions in PC+ can essentially be reduced to standard rea­
soning about actions in C + with respect to such com­
bined contexts. Note that Poole's independent choice logic 
[ 16, 17] uses a similar way of adding probabilities to an 
approach based on acyclic logic programs. 
2.1 PRELIMINARIES 
We now recall (nonmonotonic) causal theories from [7], 
which are used to specify initial sets of states and transi­
tions from states to sets of states through actions. Roughly, 
a causal theory T is a set of "causal rules" F <= G with the 
meaning "if G holds, then there is a cause for F". In this 
paper, we consider only finite T. We now first define the 
syntax of causal theories and then their semantics. 
We assume a finite set of variables X. Every variable 
X EX may take on values from a finite domain I(X). We 
define formulas by induction as follows. False and true, 
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denoted l_ and T, respectively, are formulas. If X E X 
and x E I(X), then X= x is a formula (called atom). IfF 
and G are formulas, then also �F and (F 1\ G) are formu­
las. As usual, X =I x abbreviates �x = x. A (causal) rule 
is an expression of the form F {= G, where F and G are 
formulas. A causal theory is a finite set of rules. 
An interpretation I of Y S::: X maps every Y E Y to an ele­
ment of I(Y). We use I(Y) to denote the set of all interpre­
tations of Y. We obtain I(F) and I(F {=G) from F and 
F {= G, respectively, by replacing every atom Y = y such 
that Y E Y and I(Y) = y (resp., I(Y) =I y) by T (resp., 1_). 
An interpretation I of Y satisfies an atom Y = y with 
Y E Y. denoted If= Y = y, iff I(Y) = y. Satisfaction is 
extended to all formulas over Y as usual. 
Let T be a causal theory and I be an interpretation of the 
variables in T. The reduct of T relative to I, denoted T1, is 
defined as { F I F {= G E T, I f= G}. The interpretation I 
is a model of T, denoted If= T, iff I is the unique model 
of T1. The theory T is consistent iff it has a model. 
2.2 SYNTAX OF PC+ 
We next define the syntax of the probabilistic action lan­
guage PC+, which generalizes the syntax of C+ [7]. We 
refer to [7] for further motivation and background for C+. 
We illustrate the language PC+ along a (simplistic) robot 
action domain, which is summarized in Fig. 1. This exam­
ple shows in particular how quantitative as well as quali­
tative uncertainty about both the effects of actions and the 
initial situation of the world can be encoded in PC+. 
We divide the variables in X into rigid, fluent, action, 
and context variables. The fluent variables (or fiuents) are 
additionally divided into simple and statically determined 
ones. We assume that action variables have the Boolean 
domain {1_, T}. Intuitively, the world is described through 
rigid variables and fluents. The values of rigid variables 
do not change when actions are performed, while those of 
simple (resp., statically determined) fluents may directly 
(resp., indirectly) change through actions. Action variables 
are used to describe actions, while context variables allow 
for adding probabilistic knowledge about the effects of ac­
tions and about the initial situation of the world. 
Example 2.1 In the robot action domain in Fig. I, a mo­
bile robot r may move to the locations a, b, and c, and carry 
one of two objects 01 and o2 after pickup. This world is 
described through the simple fluents at(o!), at(o2), and 
at(r) with the domain {a, b, c, lost}, where at(O) = L 
iff 0 is at location L. Moreover, we have the simple flu­
ent holds with the domain { o1, o2, nil}, where holds = 0 
iff r holds 0. We then have the action variables go to (a), 
goto(b), goto(c), pickup, and drop, which represent the 
elementary actions "move to location L", "pick up an 
object", and "drop an object", respectively. Finally, the 
action "move to location L" succeeds only with a cer-
tain probability. To model this, we use the context vari­
ables c9(a), c9(b), and c9(c) with the domain {ok,jail}, 
where c9 (L) = ok iff "move to location L" succeeds. 
We next define static causal laws, which represent knowl­
edge about fluents and rigid variables. Formally, a static 
causa/law is an expression of the form 
caused F if G ,  (I) 
where F and G are formulas such that either (a) every vari­
able occurring in F is a fluent, and no variable occurring 
in G is an action variable, or (b) every variable occurring 
in F or G is rigid. If G = T, then (I) is abbreviated by 
caused F. Roughly, (I) encodes that every state of the 
world that satisfies G should also satisfy F. More formally, 
(I) is interpreted as the causal rule F {= G. 
Example 2.2 The static causal law caused at ( 0) = L if 
holds= 01\ at(r) = L (6) expresses that if the robot r is at 
location L, and r holds 0, then 0 is also at location L. 
We now define dynamic causal laws, which express how 
the simple fluents change through actions, and which also 
encode execution denials for actions. Formally, a dynamic 
causa/law is an expression of the form 
caused F if G after H , (2) 
where F, G, and H are formulas such that (i) every vari­
able occurring in F is a simple fluent, (ii) no variable 
in G is an action variable, and (iii) no variable in H is 
a context variable. If G = T, then (2) is abbreviated by 
caused F after H. We use inertial X to abbrevi­
ate the set of all rules (2) such that F = G = H =X =x 
and x E I(X). IfF= l_ and G = T, then (2) is called an 
execution denial and abbreviated by 
nonexecutable H . (3) 
Roughly, (2) expresses that every possible next state of the 
world that satisfies G should also satisfy F, if the current 
state and the executed action satisfy H. More formally, 
(2) is interpreted as the causal rule F {= G 1\ H, where G 
and F refer to the possible next states of the world, and 
H refers to the current state and the executed action. 
Example 2.3 The dynamic causal law caused holds 
nil after drop (13) says that r holds nothing after drop. 
The execution denial (12) expresses that pickup cannot be 
executed if r already holds an object or if there is no object 
at the same location as r. The dynamic causal law (11) 
says that r cannot pick up an object that is not at the same 
location as r, and (10) says that r holds a1 respectively 02 
after pickup. Thus, there is qualitative uncertainty in the 
effects of pickup: if both o1 and o2 are at the same location 
as r, then pickup results in r picking up either a1 or o2, but 
it is unpredictable which object r actually picks up. 
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A causal law (or axiom) is a static or dynamic causal 
law. Our causal laws generalize their classical counterparts 
from [7] in the sense that they may also contain context 
variables. We next introduce the new concept of a context 
law. Context variables along with such context laws allow 
for expressing probabilistic effects of actions and proba­
bilistic knowledge about the initial situation of the world. 
More formally, a dynamic context law for a context variable 
X E X is an expression of the form 
X= (xJ: PI, ... ,Xn: Pn) after A, (4) 
where (i) I(X) ={xJ, ... ,xn}, (ii) PJ, . . .  ,pn>O, (iii) 
p1 + · · · + Pn = 1, and (iv) A is a formula over action vari­
ables. We use Pr(X =xi) to denote Pi· If A= T, then (4) 
is culled a static context larv and abbreviated by 
X = (x! :PI, ... , Xn : Pn) · (5) 
Roughly, (4) encodes that after executing an action that sat­
isfies A, the probability that X has the value xi is given 
by Pi· Note that a possible generalization of context laws 
could be to specify a set of probability distributions rather 
than a single probability distribution. 
Example 2.4 The actions goto(a), goto(b), and goto(c) 
succeed only with certain probabilities. This is modeled 
using the context variables c9(a), c9(b), and c9(c) in the 
dynamic causal laws (7) and (8), along with the dynamic 
context laws (14)-(16). For example, the probability that r 
really arrives at a after executing go to (a) is given by 0.95. 
We next define the concept of a probabilistic action descrip­
tion (resp., initial database), which encodes the effects of 
all actions (resp., the initial situation of the world). 
Definition 2.5 A probabilistic action description D is a fi­
nite set of causal and dynamic context laws such that D 
contains exactly one dynamic context law for every context 
variable X E X in D. Any such D is a probabilistic initial 
database, if all causal and context laws in D are static. 
Example 2.6 In the robot action domain in Fig. 1, the 
probabilistic action description D is completely given by 
the sentences (6)-(17). Here, axioms (6) and (17) take care 
of the well-known ramification and frame problem, respec­
tively. Note that axiom (18) forbids concurrent actions. 
A probabilistic initial database Do may be given as follows. 
The initial locations of o1 and o2 are known with proba­
bilities, which we express by the context variables Cat(o,J 
and Cat(oz), the static context laws Cat(o,J = (a: 0.1, b: 0.8, 
c: 0. 1) and Cat(oz) =(a: 0.3, b: 0.6, c: 0.1), respectively, 
and the static causal laws caused at( 0) = L if Cat(O) = L, 
where 0 E { o1, o2} and L E {a, b, c}. For example, object 
o1 is at location a with a probability of 0.1. Moreover, r is 
at a or b, expressed by caused at(r) =a V at(r) =b. Fi­
nally, r holds no object, expressed by caused holds = nil. 
(i)simpleftuents: at(O),OE{o,,o2,r}: {a,b,c,lost}; 
holds: {o1,o2, nil}. 
(ii) action variables: goto(L ), L E {a, b, c}; pickup; drop. 
(iii) context variables: c9 (L ), L E {a, b, c }: { ok,fail}. 
(iv) static causal laws: 
caused at(O) = L if holds= 0 II at(r) = L (6) 
(v) dynamic causal laws: 
caused at(r) = L if c9(£) = ok after goto(L) (7) 
caused at(r) = L' if at(r) = L' llc9(L) =fail (8) 
after goto(L) (for L' # L) 
nonexecutable goto(L) II at(r) = L (9) 
caused holds= 0 if holds= 0 (10) 
after pickup (for 0 E { 01, 02}) 
caused .L if holds = 0 (i i) 
after pickup llat(r) = L II at(O) # L 
nonexecutable pickup II [holds # nil (12) 
V (at ( r) = L II at ( 01) # L II at ( 02) # L) J 
caused holds= nil after drop (13) 
(vi) dynamic context laws: 
c9(a) = (ok: 0.95,/ail: 0.05) after goto(a) (14) 
c9(b) = (ok: 0.95,/ail: 0.05) after goto(b) (15) 
c9(c) = (ok: 0.90,/ail: 0.10) after goto(c) (16) 
(vii) inertial laws: for all simple ftuents f :  
inertial f (17) 
(viii) other execution denials: for all action variables a, # a2: 
nonexecutable a 1 II a2 (18) 
Figure 1: Robot Action Domain 
In the sequel, D (resp., Do ) denotes a probabilistic action 
description (resp., probabilistic initial database). 
2.3 SEMANTICS OF PC+ 
We now define the semantics of PC+. Informally, certain 
interpretations of rigid and fluent variables serve as possi­
ble states of the world. We then associate with D0 a collec­
tion of sets of such states, where each set of states has an 
associated probability. Furthermore, we associate with D 
a mapping that assigns to each pair (S, a) , consisting of 
a current set of states S and a labeled action or observa­
tion a, a probability distribution on a collection of future 
sets of states. Thus, we interpret D by probabilistic transi­
tions as in partially observable Markov decision processes 
(POMDPs) [11]. But the probabilistic transitions here are 
between sets of states rather than single states, which al­
lows to handle qualitative uncertainty in addition to quan­
titative probabilistic uncertainty. Actions and observations 
are treated in a uniform way and labeled with modalities to 
specify how their preconditions (resp., observed formulas) 
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are evaluated on sets of states (see also Section 4 ). 
Semantics of D0• Informally, we associate with Do a finite 
set of contexts '"'f, where every context 'Y is in tum associ­
ated with a probability value Pr 0('Y) and a set of states <1>-y. 
Thus, Do is interpreted as the collection of all <1>-y, where 
each <1>-y has the probability Pr 0('Y). We say that Do is 
consistent iff <1>-y I' 0 for all contexts 'Y· 
Formally, let X0 denote the set of all context variables 
in D0. We call 'Y E I(X0) a context for Do. Its probabil­
ity, denoted Pro ('"'f), is defined as ITxEx,Pr(X ='"'((X)). 
For X0 = 0, the empty mapping 'Y = 0 is the only context 
for D0, which has the probability Pro b)= 1. 
For each 'Y E I(X0), we define <1>-y as the set of all models 
over rigid and fluent variables of the causal theory compris­
ing all 'Y(Fo�;=G) for each axiom (I) in Do and all X =x <;= 
X= x for each simple fluent X E X  and x E I(X). 
In order to define the semantics of D, we now formally 
define states, actions, and observations. We also define how 
a context '"'f, current state s, and action or observation a is 
associated with a set of future states <I> "Y ( s, a). 
States. A state s is either a member of some <I> "Y, or a 
model over rigid and fluent variables of the causal the­
ory comprising all 'Y(F <;=G) for each axiom (I) in D, for 
any interpretation 'Y of the context variables in X, and all 
X= x <;=X = x for each simple fluent X EX and xEI (X). 
Actions. An action a is an interpretation of the action vari­
ables in X. Intuitively, each action variable is a basic ac­
tion, and a is the concurrent execution of all basic actions 
that are true under a. The precondition for a, denoted 1fa, 
is the conjunction of all --,H for every execution denial (3) 
in D such that s U a f= H for some state s. An action a is 
executable in a state s, denoted 7r a ( s), iff s U a p 1r a. 
We next associate with every action a a set of contexts, 
and with each such context 'Y a probability Pr a ('Y) and a 
mapping from states s to a set of future states <1>-y(s, a) . In­
tuitively, if a is executed in the state s under the context 'Y, 
then the set of future states is given by <I> "Y ( s, a) . 
Formally, for states s such that 7ra(s), denote by Xs,a the 
set of all context variables in some axiom (I) or (2) in D 
such that sUa pH. We define Xa as the union of all Xs,a· 
We call 'Y E I(Xa) a context for a. Its probability, deno­
ted Pr a b), is defined as IIxEXa Pr(X = 'Y(X)). 
An action transition is a triple (s, a, s'), where s and s' 
are states such that s(X) = s' (X) for every rigid variable 
X E X, and a is an action such that 7r a ( s). A formula F is 
caused in (s, a, s') under 'Y E I(Xa) iff D contains either 
(a) an axiom (I) such that s' U'"'f f= G, or (b) an axiom (2) 
such that sUa f= H and s' U 'Y f= G. We say (s, a, s') is 
causally explained under 'Y iff s' is the only interpretation 
that satisfies all formulas caused in (s, a, s') under 'Y· For 
every states and action a, we define <1>-y(s, a) as the set 
of all s' such that (s, a, s') is causally explained under 'Y· 
Note that <1>-y(s, a)= 0 if no such (s, a, s') exists, in partic­
ular, if the action a is not executable in the states. 
Observations. An observation w is a formula over fluents. 
For states s, we use 1r w ( s) to abbreviate s f= w. In order to 
treat actions and observations in a uniform way, we also as­
sociate with every observation w a set of contexts, and with 
each such context 'Y a probability Pr w ('Y) and a mapping 
from states s to a set of future states <1>-y ( s, w). 
Formally, we define Xw =0. The empty mapping '"'(El(Xw) 
is the context for w. It has the probability Pr w ('Y) = 1. 
For states s and observations w, we define <1>-y(s, w) = { s }, 
ifnw(s), and <1>-y(s,w) = 0, otherwise. 
We are now ready to define the semantics of D. 
Semantics of D. Intuitively, we use D to associate with 
sets of states S, and actions or observations a a probability 
distribution on future sets of states Pr u ( · IS). We say D 
is consistent iff <1>-y(s, a) I' 0 for all states s, actions a with 
1r a ( s), and contexts 'Y E I (X a). We now first extend 7r u ( s) 
and <I> "Y ( s, a) from states s to sets of states S. 
In order to specify how preconditions of actions (resp., 
observed formulas) are evaluated on sets of states, we 
add modality labels to actions (resp., observations). For­
mally, a labeled action (resp., labeled observation) is of 
the form o r, where o E { <>, D} and r is an action (resp., 
observation). For sets of states S, we use rro r(S) (resp., 
7ror (S)) to denote :3 s E S: 7r r ( s) (resp., V s E S: 7r r ( s) ). 
Moreover, we define Xor = Xr and Pror = Pr r. 
For every set of states S, every labeled action or observa­
tion a= o T with 7ru(S), and every context 'Y E I(Xu ), we 
then define <1>-y(S, a)= UsES <1>-y(s, r) . Observe that for 
observations w, it holds that <1>-y(S, <>w) = {s E SIs f=w} 
and <1>-y(S, Dw) = S. 
We are now ready to define the probabilistic transition be­
tween sets of states S andS' under a with nu(S) by: 
Intuitively, given any set of states S such that rr u(S), the 
<1>-y(S, a) 's are the future sets of states under a, where 
each <1>-y(S, a) has the probability Pr u('Y). 
Assumption 2.7 In the rest of this paper, we implicitly as­
sume that D and Do are consistent, and that all static causal 
laws (I) in D over rigid variables also belong to Do. 
3 HISTORIES AND BELIEF STATES 
Our framework for reasoning and planning in PC+ invol­
ves finite sequences of labeled actions and observations, 
called histories, which are inductively defined as follows. 
The empty history c: is a history. If h is a history, and a 
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is a labeled action or observation, then h, CT is a history. 
Histories c:, r are abbreviated by r. The action length of a 
history h is the number of occurrences of actions in h. 
Example 3.1 In the running example, Ogoto(b), Dpicku p, 
Dgoto(c), Dat(ol)=cVat(o2)=c is a history of action 
length 3. Informally, it represents the statement "if goto(b) 
has been executed, then pickup, goto(c) can be executed, 
and at(o1)=cV at(o2)=c is observed after that". 
We use the notion of a belief state to describe the proba­
bilistic information associated with a history h. Intuitively, 
a belief state consists of a probability value for h and a 
probability function on a set of state sets. 
Definition 3.2 The belief state bh=(ph, Sh, Prh) for a his­
tory h consists of a real number Ph E[O, 1] (called probabil­
ity of h, denoted Pr(h)), a set of state sets Sh, and a prob­
ability function Pr h on Sh. It is inductively defined by: 
• If h = c:, then Ph =  1, Sh = { 1>, hE J(Xo)}, and for 
all S E Sh, Prh(S) = I:, E I(Xo), S=<l>, Pro(!). 
• If h = r ,  CT ,  then bh is defined iff (i) br = CPn Sr, Prr) 
is defined, and (ii) 'll'u(S) for some SESr. If bh is defined, 
then it is given as follows: 
Ph = Pr · L:sEs.,,-.(S) Prr(S) 
Sh = {1>,(S,CT) i'YEI(Xu), S E Sr, 'll'u(S)} 
Prh(S') = &.. I:sesr. Pru(S'IS)·Prr(S) (VS'ESh). Ph 11",.(S) 
Intuitively, b, describes the probabilistic knowledge associ­
ated with D0, while br,u represents the probabilistic knowl­
edge about the world after the history r, o a (resp., r, ow), 
which depends on (i) our respective knowledge after r, and 
(ii) the effects of a encoded in D (resp., the observation w). 
The following result shows that CT =ow corresponds to a 
conditioning of Prr on all state sets SE Sr with 'll'u(S), 
along with removing from such S all states violating w. 
Proposition 3.3 Let h = r, CT be a history, where CT =ow is 
a labeled observation. Then, bh =(ph, Sh, Prh) is defined 
iff (i) br = (Pro Sro Pr r) is defined, and ( ii) some S E Sr 
exists with 'll'u(S). Ifbh is defined, then it is given by: 
Ph = Pr · L:sESr,,.u(S) Prr(S) 
Sh ={{sESisf= w}IS E Sr,'ll'u(S)} 
Prh(S') = � · I: s e Sr, ... (S), Prr(S) (V S' E Sh). S' ={5 E S !sF= w} 
4 REASONING AND PLANNING IN PC+ 
We now show at the examples of prediction, postdiction, 
and planning [ 18, 12, 7] how important problems in prob­
abilistic reasoning about actions can be formulated in our 
framework of PC+. We define them in terms of proba­
bilities of histories in PC+. Recall that the probability 
of a history h, denoted Pr(h), is defined as Ph, where 
bh =(Ph, Sh, Prh) is the belief state for h. 
4.1 PREDICTION 
We consider the following probabilistic prediction (or also 
probabilistic temporal projection) problem: Compute the 
probability that a sequence CT of actions and observations 
is certainly possible, given that another sequence CT1 of ac­
tions and observations has occurred. Here, the probability 
that CT is certainly possible after CT1 is the tight lower bound 
for the probability that CT is possible after CT1• We now de­
fine this probability in terms of probabilities of histories. 
Note that further semantically meaningful probabilities can 
be defined in a similar way, for example, the probability 
that CT may be possible after CT1, which is the tight upper 
bound for the probability that CT is possible after CT1• 
Definition 4.1 Let CT = CT1, ... , CTm and CT1 = CT;, ... , CT� be 
sequences of actions and observations. The probability 
that CT is certainly possible, denoted Fred ( E: 1> CT), is de­
fined as Pr(Dcr1, .. . , Dcrm)· The probability that cr is cer­
tainly possible after cr', denoted Fred ( cr' 1> cr) , is defined as 
Pr( ocr; ' . . .  ' Ocr�, OCT!' ... ' DCTm) I Pr( ocr;' . . . 'Ocr�) . 
Proposition 4.2 Let a=a1, a2, ... , an ( resp., w1, w2, ... , 
wn) be a sequence of actions (resp., observations), and 
let¢ and 'ljJ be observations. Then, 
• Pred(E: 1> ¢,a, '1/J) is the probability that ¢ certainly 
holds initially, that a can certainly be executed, and that '1/J 
certainly holds after that. 
• Pred(¢> 1> a, '1/J) is the probability that a can certainly 
be executed, and that then '1/J certainly holds, given that ¢ 
is observed initially. 
• Fred(¢>, a 1> '1/J) is the probability that '1/J certainly holds, 
given ¢ is observed initially, and a has been executed. 
• Pred(E: 1> ¢,a!,WJ,a2,w2, .. . ,an,wn) is the prob­
ability that ¢ certainly holds initially, that a =  a1, a2, 
. .. , an can certainly be executed, and that then w1, w2, 
... , Wn, respectively, certainly hold. 
Example 4.3 Let Do and D be given as in Example 2.6. 
Suppose that the robot r is initially at location a and 
holds no object. Moreover, assume that the two objects o1 
and o2 are both at location b. Then, the probability that 
the robot r can certainly move to b, can certainly pickup 
an object, and can certainly move to c, and that then at 
least one object is certainly at location c is given by 0.855: 
Let¢ = at(r) = a/\ at(ol) = b /\ at(o2) = b/\ holds= nil, 
a=goto(b), pickup, goto(c), and 'I/J=at(ol)=cVat(o2)=c. 
We then have Fred ( ¢ 1> a, '1/J) = 0. 855, which is obtained 
as follows (cf. Fig. 2.a). Observation ¢ leads to a con­
text (O: Cat(od• 0: Cat(o2)) = (b, b) of probability 0. 8 · 0.6. 
Action goto(b) then yields two contexts, 1 :c9(b) = ok and 
1: c9 (b) = fail of probabilities 0.95 and 0.05, respectively. 
Action picku p is only executable in 1: c9(b) = ok, which 
leads to the empty context 0 of probability 1. Finally, action 
goto(c) yields two contexts 3:c9(c) =ok and 3:c9(c) = 
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(a) Prediction (b) Postdiction 
Figure 2: Evolving Contexts1 
fail of probabilities 0.9 and 0.1, respectively; in the for­
mer, 1/J is true in all states, but not in the latter. In summary, 
Fred(¢ 1> a,1/;) = Pr(<>¢, Oa, 01/J)/Pr(<>¢) = (0.8·0.6 · 
o.95 . o.9) 1 (0.8 · o.6) = o.855. 
The probability that at least one object is certainly at lo­
cation c after r moved to b, picked up an object, and then 
moved to c is given by Fred(¢, a 1> 1/;) = 0.9. 
The probability that r can certainly move to b, can cer­
tainly pickup an object, and can certainly move to c, and 
that then object o1 is certainly at location c is given by 
Fred(¢ 1> a, 1/J') = 0, where 1/J' = at( oi)=c, as in no emerg­
ing context, 1/J' is true in all states. Indeed, in the worst 
case, r might pick up o2 and carry it to c. Thus, the prob­
ability that o1 is at c after ¢, a may be 0. In contrast, if we 
have a probability distribution for pickup, then Fred(¢ 1> 
a, 1/J') > 0, if r picks up o1 with a positive probability. 
Finally, suppose that object o2 is initially at either a or b, 
rather than at b. Hence, consider now¢' = at(r) =a 1\ 
at(ol) = b/\ (at(02) =a Vat(o2) =b) /\holds= nil, which 
is weaker than ¢. We then obtain Fred ( ¢' 1> a, 1/J) = 
Fred(¢ 1> a,1/;) and Fred(¢' 1> a, 1j;') >Fred(¢ 1> a, 1j;'). 
Here, we have a positive probability, since there exists a 
combined context of positive probability that satisfies ¢', 
where object o2 is absent from b, which makes pickup de­
terministic, and thus o1 is certainly carried to c. 
4.2 POSTDICTION 
Informally, the probabilistic postdiction (or also proba­
bilistic explanation) problem that we consider here can be 
formulated as follows: Compute the probability that obser­
vations were certainly holding along a sequence of actions 
and observations v that actually happened. 
Definition 4.4 Let v2 be a sequence of actions and ob­
servations, and let v1 result from v2 by removing some 
observations. Then, the probability that vz certainly oc­
curred if v1 has occurred, denoted Post(vzlv1), is defined 
as Pr(v�) J Pr(v[), where v� and v; result from Vz and v1, 
respectively, by labeling removed observations in v2 with 
0 and all other actions and observations with <>. 
Proposition 4.5 Let a=a1, a2, . . . , an (resp., w1, wz, . . .  , 
Wn) be a sequence of actions (resp., observations), v=a1, 
w1, a2, wz, . . .  , an, Wn, and¢, 1/J be observations. Then, 
• Post(¢, a, 1/Jia, 1j;) is the probability that¢ certainly 
held initially, given a was executed and 1/J was observed. 
• Post(¢, vlv) is the probability that ¢ was certainly 
holding initially, given a1, a2, . . . , an was executed, and 
w1, w2, . • •  , W11, respectively, was observed after that. 
• Post(¢, via) is the probability that ¢ was certainly 
holding initially, and w1, w2, . . . , Wn was certainly holding 
after a1, a2, ... , an, respectively, given a was executed. 
Example 4.6 Let Do and D be given as in Example 2.6. 
Suppose that the robot r moved to b, picked up an object, 
and then moved to c, and that the object o1 was observed 
at c after that. Then, the probability that the object o1 
was certainly at bin the initial situation is given by 0.923: 
Consider a= goto(b), pickup, goto(c), 1/J = at(o1 )=c, and 
¢=at( oi)=b. We then have Post(¢, a, 1/Jia, 1/J) =0.923, 
which is obtained as follows: Each of the 9 initial contexts, 
given by the value pairs for (O:cat(o1) , O:cat(o2)), except 
(c, c) admits execution of a resulting in a context in which 
1/J is observable. In detail, (b, a), (b, b), (b, c), and ( c ,  b) 
can be extended by 1: c9(b) = ok, 0, and 3: c9(c) = ok, 
and (a, a), (a, b), (a, c), and (c, a) by 1: c9(b) =fail, 0, 
3:c9(c) =ok (cf.Fig. 2.b). Let v1 =a, 1j;andvz =¢, a, 1f;. 
Then, Pr(v;) = (0.24 + 0.48 + 0.08 + 0.06) · 0.95 · 0.9 + 
(0.03+0.06+0.01 +0.03) ·0.05·0.9 = 0. 741 and Pr(v�) = 
(0.24 + 0.48 + 0.08) · 0.95 · 0.9 = 0.684, as¢ only holds 
in (b, a), (b, b), and (b, c). Hence, Post(¢, a, 1/J I a, 1/;) = 
Pr(v�)/ Pr(v[) = 0.923. Note that if at(r) f. b would be 
observed after goto(b) in a, then we could conclude that 
initially ¢ has the probability 0, which is intuitive. 
4.3 PLANNING 
We now formulate the notions of a (sequential) plan and 
of its goodness for reaching a goal observation given that a 
sequence of actions and observations has occurred. 
Definition 4. 7 Let v be a sequence of actions and observa­
tions and 1/J an observation. The sequence of actions a = 
a1, . . . , an is a plan of goodness g for 1/J after v has oc­
curred, denoted Plan(v; a; 1/J) = g, iff Pred(v 1> a, 1/;) =g. 
1Pairs (x, y) are short for (0: Cat(ol)• 0; Cat(o2) )=(x, y). 
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In the general planning problem in our framework, we are 
then given a sequence of actions and observations v that 
has occurred, a goal observation 1/J, and a threshold B, and 
we want to compute a plan a such that Plan(v; a; 1/J):;:, e. 
Example 4.8 Let Do and D be as in Example 2.6. Let 
¢ = at(r)=a!lat(ot)=b!lat(o2)=band1j; = at(o1)=c V 
at(o2)=c. Then, a= goto(b),pickup, goto(c) is a plan of 
goodness 0.885 for 1j; given that¢ holds initially. 
On the other hand, Plan(¢; a; 1/J ') = 0 for 1/J' = at(ot)=c, 
since r might (unpredictably) carry o2 to c instead of o1. 
However, Plan(¢, a', 1j;')=0.8852=0.731 fora'=a, drop, 
goto(b),pickup,goto(c). Note that a' is optimal, since 
moving twice to c and to b is necessary in general. 
If pickup would be probabilistic and, e.g., obey the uni­
form distribution, then Plan(¢; a;¢')> 0 would hold. In­
deed, there would be a context c after executing a where 1/J 
holds in all its associated states. A wrong pickup decreases 
the success probability, which is, however, still non-zero. 
5 SUMMARY AND OUTLOOK 
We have presented the probabilistic action language PC+, 
which generalizes C + by probabilistic information into an 
expressive framework for dealing with qualitative as well 
as quantitative uncertainty about actions. Its formal seman­
tics is defined in terms of probabilistic transitions between 
sets of states. We have then shown that, using the concepts 
of a history and its belief state, several important problems 
in reasoning about actions can be concisely expressed in it. 
In the extended report [ 4], we also provide a formulation 
of conditional planning in PC+. Furthermore, we present 
a compact representation of belief states, which is based on 
the notion of a context to encode possible sets of states, and 
we prove its correctness in implementing belief states. Fi­
nally, we also discuss how to reduce probabilistic reason­
ing about actions in PC+ to reasoning in nonmonotonic 
causal theories [7], which is a step towards implementa­
tion on top of existing technology for nonmonotonic causal 
theories (such as the Causal Calculator [14]). 
An interesting topic of future research is to provide more 
efficient algorithms and a detailed complexity analysis for 
probabilistic reasoning about actions in PC+ . Other inter­
esting topics are to add costs to planning and conditional 
planning and to define in our framework further seman­
tic notions like counterfactuals, interventions, actual cause, 
and causal explanations, taking inspiration by similar con­
cepts in the structural-model approach to causality [15, 9]. 
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